There’s too much money in American elections!
This long-used mantra of the reform community has at least one glaring weakness—it strongly lacks empirical evidence. Fortunately, CCP’s newest Academic Advisor John Coleman has taken an interest in examining the verity of this tired, old quip.
John Coleman is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (he also chairs the department). His academic interests are concentrated in campaign finance as well as public involvement and interest in politics. He is the author or co-editor of several books and a variety of articles on these subjects. Currently, he is engaged in research efforts relative to campaign finance and how the public holds political parties accountable in elections.
In a 2003 briefing paper written for the Cato Institute, “The Benefits of Campaign Spending,” Coleman answers the critics who decry the role and volume of money in American elections. While much academic research exists on campaign spending, the vast majority of studies analyze how campaign spending affects electoral success, ignoring how campaign spending affects democracy. In his studies, Coleman endeavors to fill the void. In this summary article, he uses his past works to respond to five frequent complaints about the effect of high levels of campaign spending on public trust, participation, knowledge, candidate behavior, and inequality.
(1) “Large sums of campaign money erode the public’s trust in its government!”
Using a statistical analysis of spending and public opinion data from the 1994 and 1996 U.S. House elections to measure how the level of spending in political races affected public trust in government and elections, Coleman concluded that high levels of campaign spending do not contribute to citizens’ pessimism about government and politics. To the contrary, there were two instances in which greater campaign spending actually promoted public trust. In 1996, high incumbent spending increased public opinion that government existed for the benefit of all-and not for big interests. Positive results existed for challengers as well: in 1996, high challenger spending decreased citizens’ views that politicians were corrupt.
(2) “More money in elections means less citizen involvement!”
After comparing the same U.S. House election data with survey answers from respondents on questions related to electoral interest and participation, Coleman found no statistically significant relationship between levels of campaign spending and public involvement and interest in the electoral process. In eight out of ten instances, high levels of spending either increased involvement or had no effect on it.
(3) “More money leads to more manipulating ads, which leads to a less knowledgeable public.”
To study the effect of campaign spending on public knowledge, Coleman utilized 20 different measures. In 18 of the 20 measures, higher spending resulted in an increase in public knowledge. Overall, the results demonstrated that spending by both incumbents and challengers increased citizens’ political knowledge, and moreover, that challenger spending is even more effective than incumbent spending at increasing political knowledge. What this indicates about public policy cannot be understated: using contribution limits to restrict spending results in a less informed electorate.
(4) “If candidates are permitted to spend unlimited sums of money in elections, they will mislead the electorate about their positions on the issues.”
By coupling incumbents’ voting records with survey respondents’ placement of candidates on a political ideology scale, Coleman was able to test the accuracy of the public on electoral information. Unsurprisingly, reformers’ claims were again refuted. Coleman found that the greater the spending of the incumbent, the greater the accuracy of the respondent in regards to the incumbent’s ideological leanings. An incumbent who ran a $1 million election campaign resulted in a public that is 49 percent accurate about the candidate’s ideology. The pattern held as spending rose as well: an incumbent who spent $1.5 million on their re-election campaign generated a public that is 63 percent accurate about their ideological placement. Spending by the incumbent’s opponent generally decreased the public’s accuracy about the incumbent’s positions, as the goal of the challenger was to call into question the positions of the incumbent. Thus, the effect was a more thoughtful, critical electorate.
(5) “High spending furthers the information gap between the privileged classes and the less privileged.”
By comparing the effects of campaign spending on a variety of opposite group pairings (educated vs. uneducated, rich vs. poor, partisans vs. nonpartisans, etc.), Coleman found that political knowledge benefits derived from campaign spending are spread across both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. For example, if a challenger spends $650,000 on a political race, 78 percent of advantaged individuals and 69 percent of disadvantaged individuals could accurately place the challenger on an ideology scale. As spending increases, the knowledge gap decreases-a far cry from reformers’ claims that spending furthers an information gap of any kind.
Aside from the reformers’ allegations being refuted in each instance, in each example above, a common thread is evident: high levels of campaign spending have positive effects on public trust in government, participation in elections, and knowledge about the candidates throughout society. Accordingly, Coleman concludes that campaign spending improves the quality of our democracy and results in a more engaged political culture. The policy conclusions are clear: as low levels of campaign spending are unlikely to increase trust, participation, and knowledge, spending limits are equivalent to a reduction in the level of public knowledge and participation in American elections.
Coleman’s article, “The Benefits of Campaign Spending,” can be found here.
